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Abstract
We describe a use of formal methods to specify and check a Web Services protocol. The Web
Services Atomic Transaction protocol was speciﬁed in TLA+ and checked with the TLC model
checker. A modest eﬀort revealed oversights that caused unanticipated behaviors of the protocol;
these were corrected by clariﬁcations and changes to the protocol.
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1 Introduction
Web Services (WS) are meant to overcome the integration problem for hetero-
geneous distributed applications [2]. A large number of protocols that use the
SOAP [9] conventions for message exchange are now under development. Cur-
rent and future applications will depend on the correctness of these protocols.
As with any distributed system, WS protocols can permit obscure behaviors
that are hard to understand, and it will be very diﬃcult to debug them. Since
the dependence on Internet-based systems is increasing dramatically, it is im-
portant that these protocols operate correctly.
Our goal is to apply formal methods to the process of standardizing WS
protocols. To test our approach, we selected a non-trivial example—namely,
the WS Atomic Transaction protocol [3]. (Two of the authors were involved in
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designing the protocol.) Our experience, reported here, shows that writing and
model checking a TLA+ speciﬁcation can help eliminate errors and ambiguities
in a protocol. TLA+ can be used to help achieve the reliability required in
the design of a WS protocol standard. We also believe that writing formal
speciﬁcations can aid in the process of designing WS protocols.
2 Example: Web Service Atomic Transaction
In a distributed application system, resources like databases and/or caches are
accessed by diﬀerent processes. If the resources’ state changes must satisfy the
well-known ACID properties [6], updates must use a commit protocol. WS
Atomic Transaction (WS-AT) is a protocol designed for this purpose.
The transaction protocol is begun by an initiator process and controlled
by a transaction coordinator. Participant processes that manage the resources
register for the transaction. At some point, the initiator can decide to abort
or try to commit the transaction. Roughly speaking, the goal of the protocol
is to guarantee that the initiator and the participants agree on whether the
transaction is committed or aborted.
All of the protocol’s messages go to or from the transaction coordinator.
Any communication between the initiator and the participants is application
speciﬁc and is not part of the protocol.
WS-AT is based on the well-known two-phase commit (2PC) protocol [1].
However, it has two non-standard features. The ﬁrst is the registration pro-
cedure. Registration is often ignored in textbook descriptions of 2PC. The
second non-standard feature is that it distinguishes two classes of partici-
pants, called volatile and durable, based on the type of resource that they are
expected to manage. A cache is an example of a volatile resource; a conven-
tional database is a durable resource. The standard 2PC protocol uses two
phases, prepare and commit. WS-AT uses three phases, prepare for volatile
participants, prepare for durable participants, and commit. A participant may
register any time before the beginning of the prepare phase for its class. Thus,
durable participants can still be registering during the volatile participants’
prepare phase.
3 Formal Speciﬁcation and TLA+
A WS protocol standard should describe precisely the behavior relevant for
interoperability. It should omit internal implementation details such as when
records are written to stable storage. It should permit someone to implement
one of the parties in the protocol without knowing anything about how the
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other parties are implemented. Therefore, a standard should be an unam-
biguous and complete description of the allowed behavior of the protocol’s
participants. WS standards have formal mechanisms to specify the format of
XML data structures [10] and service interfaces [5]. However, they generally
do not have methods of precisely specifying the complete behavior of a pro-
tocol. They instead employ informal descriptions of the protocol that can be
imprecise, ambiguous, or incomplete; they often fail to consider unusual cases.
The need for precision and completeness in a standard naturally suggests
the use of formal methods. Such methods use a well-deﬁned language with
a precise semantics for writing formal speciﬁcations of a protocol’s allowed
behaviors. Tools can be applied to analyze those behaviors and help check the
correctness of the protocol.
There is no generally accepted method of formally specifying a WS pro-
tocol. State tables that are given in some speciﬁcations are a step in that
direction, but they are usually not written as precisely as formal speciﬁca-
tions.
TLA+ [8] is a language for writing high-level speciﬁcations of concurrent
systems. Unlike most speciﬁcation languages, it is based on mathematics
rather than programming-language constructs. This makes it extremely ex-
pressive. It has no built-in constructs for operations like sending a message,
but the language is expressive enough that such operations are easily deﬁned
within a speciﬁcation. Thus, instead of having to use some particular message
passing semantics built into the language (for example, lossless FIFO deliv-
ery), one can specify whatever assumptions one wants to make about message
delivery.
The WS-AT protocol is straightforward enough that it should be easy
to describe in any serious speciﬁcation language. However, as explained in
Section 4 below, there is one place in the speciﬁcation where what one process
does depends upon the internal state of another process. This can be hard to
model in some languages designed expressly for distributed systems. TLA+has
been used to describe a wide range of concurrent systems, so we are conﬁdent
of its ability to specify any desired WS protocol.
Because it is so mathematical, TLA+ seems foreign to most engineers.
However, we have found that engineers can very quickly learn to read TLA+
speciﬁcations. Learning to write TLA+ speciﬁcations seems to be about as
hard as learning a new programming language.
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4 Modeling the Protocol in TLA+
In the summer of 2003, we began a small project to write a TLA+ speciﬁcation
of the WS Atomic Transaction protocol. Two of the authors are researchers
experienced in using formal methods; the other two are experts on this partic-
ular protocol, having participated in its design. The project lasted 21
2
months.
It was a background activity, so the actual time spent was not large—perhaps
11
2
man-months. The result of the project was a TLA+ speciﬁcation of the pro-
tocol, written by the researchers, and two higher-level speciﬁcations, written
by the designers with the assistance of the researchers.
The protocol speciﬁcation has been read by the designers to determine that
it corresponds to their idea of what the protocol does. It has been checked
with the TLC model checker to determine that it is complete (speciﬁes what
should occur on the receipt of any possible message) and that it satisﬁes the
basic correctness property of the protocol (agreement on the outcome of the
transaction).
The researchers were initially given a preliminary version of the oﬃcial
speciﬁcation [3]. (Its state table was the part that they found most useful.)
They met with the designers three times, and they also asked questions of the
designers by email.
The ﬁrst task we faced was deciding what kind of speciﬁcation to write.
There is no notion of a “right” speciﬁcation of a system. A speciﬁcation is an
abstraction that is meant to serve some purpose. We found that there were
basically two ways to model the protocol. One was to faithfully formalize
the description of the protocol in the oﬃcial speciﬁcation. The second was
to write a simpler model whose primary goal was to verify the completeness
and correctness of the protocol. We chose the second option. We therefore
collapsed multiple states from the oﬃcial speciﬁcation’s state table into single
states in the TLA+ speciﬁcation. This reduced the total number of protocol
states, making the speciﬁcation easier to check. Other modeling questions
that we faced were:
• Whether communication between the initiator and the coordinator should
be internal or by messages. The designers decided it was all right to let it
be internal.
• What assumptions should be made about the message-passing infrastruc-
ture. The designers decided that the speciﬁcation should allow messages to
be reordered, lost, and duplicated.
Additional questions arose because some aspects of the protocol were not
described clearly enough in the oﬃcial speciﬁcation to permit their formal
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speciﬁcation. An important example of this was the registration procedure.
The researchers did not understand why a Register message from a new par-
ticipant could not arrive after the coordinator had forgotten all about the
transaction. This could not be resolved by inspecting the oﬃcial speciﬁcation
because registration is described in a diﬀerent standard (the WS-Coordination
protocol standard [4]). The oﬃcial speciﬁcation did not clearly explain the
interaction between these two protocols. We eventually decided to let the
TLA+ speciﬁcation describe the necessary synchronization between register-
ing processes and the coordinator without indicating how it is achieved. Thus,
the speciﬁcation has an action by one process enabled by a predicate on the
state of another process, without describing how the ﬁrst process learns about
the second process’s state. (This is easily expressed in TLA+, but would be
diﬃcult in a speciﬁcation language based on communicating automata.)
Most of the eﬀort consisted of resolving these issues, many of which were
discovered only while writing the speciﬁcation. The complete speciﬁcation
consists of about 350 lines of TLA+ plus 500 lines of comments. Once one
understands what a protocol does and how is should be modeled, actually
writing its speciﬁcation is not hard.
The speciﬁcation is well suited to model checking. TLC checked that
the basic agreement property is satisﬁed by a model containing four partici-
pants. For this model, the protocol has about 500,000 reachable states, with
its longest non-repeating behavior containing 45 states. TLC checked it in
about 41
4
minutes on a 2-processor, 2.4GHz PC. The protocol is straightfor-
ward enough that the speciﬁcation is highly unlikely to contain any error that
would manifest itself only on a larger model, given the topology of the com-
munication patterns and the indistinguishability of transaction participants.
Our eﬀort did not reveal any major issues with the core durable 2PC
protocol. This was to be expected, since that part of the protocol is very well
understood. However, it did expose several problems with registration and
with the volatile 2PC protocol. The use of the WS-Coordination protocol to
control registration within a transaction commit protocol is new, as is the use
of separate volatile and durable 2PC protocols. The interaction of these new
features turned out to be more complicated than expected. Model checking
revealed behaviors of the protocol that were not anticipated by the designers.
This led to clariﬁcations and changes to the oﬃcial speciﬁcation.
5 Overview of the TLA+ Protocol Speciﬁcation
The complete TLA+ speciﬁcation with comments is too long to present here;
and like most formal speciﬁcations, it would be very hard to understand with-
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out comments. Instead, we describe its “ﬂavor”, showing just small pieces of
the speciﬁcation. The complete speciﬁcations are posted on the Web [7].
Recall that the protocol involves an initiator, a transaction coordinator
(TC), and a set of participants. The TC exchanges messages with the partic-
ipants. As noted above, we modeled the initiator and TC as a single process.
The speciﬁcation declares the constant parameter Participant , which repre-
sents the set of participants.
We specify only the safety properties of the protocol (what is permitted
to happen), not its liveness properties (what must eventually happen). This
enables a very simple representation of message passing. A variable msgs
represents the set of all messages that have ever been sent. An action that,
in an implementation, would be enabled by the receipt of certain messages
is, in the speciﬁcation, enabled by the existence of those messages in msgs .
Recall that we decided to allow messages to be lost, duplicated, or received
out of order. Since msgs is a set, messages can be received in any order. Loss
of a message is represented by simply not executing that action, even though
the action is enabled. (Because we specify only safety properties, there is
no requirement that an enabled action is ever executed.) Duplicate message
delivery is allowed because messages are never removed from msgs , so once a
message is in the set, the action of receiving that message is always enabled.
There are three other variables: iState is a record describing the initiator’s
state, tcData is a record describing the data maintained by the coordinator,
and pData is an array, where pData[p] is a record describing the state of
participant p.
Correctness of the protocol is expressed by invariance of a state predicate
Consistency . It asserts that the protocol is not in an inconsistent ﬁnal or
ﬁnishing state—that is, where one process thinks the protocol committed and
another thinks it has aborted. It has two separate conjuncts, one asserting
what is true if the initiator has reached the committed state, and the other
asserting what is true if a participant has reached the committed state. These
two conjuncts are not logically independent, but we have not eliminated the
redundancy in order to make it clear what is being asserted. The deﬁnition
is as follows. We do not expect the reader to understand the predicate in
detail, but rather to appreciate the essentially mathematical nature of the
speciﬁcation. TLA+ uses the convention that a list of expressions bulleted by
∧ or ∨ represents their conjunction or disjunction, and indentation is used to
eliminate parentheses.
Consistency
∆
=
∧ (iState = “committed”)
⇒ ∨ ∧ tcData.st = “ended”
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∧ tcData.res = “committed”
∧ ∀ p ∈ Participant :
∨ pData[p].st = “unregistered”
∨ ∧ pData[p].st = “ended”
∧ pData[p].res ∈ {“?”, “committed”}
∨ ∧ tcData.st = “committing”
∧ ∀ p ∈ Participant :
∨ pData[p].st ∈ {“unregistered”, “prepared”}
∨ ∧ pData[p].st = “ended”
∧ pData[p].res ∈ {“?”, “committed”}
∧ ∀ p ∈ Participant :
∧ pData[p].st = “ended”
∧ pData[p].res = “committed”
⇒ ∧ iState = “committed”
∧ ∨ ∧ tcData.st = “ended”
∧ tcData.res = “committed”
∧ iState = “committed”
∨ tcData.st = “committing”
∧ ∀ pp ∈ Participant :
∨ pData[pp].st ∈ {“unregistered”, “prepared”}
∨ ∧ pData[pp].st = “ended”
∧ pData[pp].res ∈ {“?”, “committed”}
A TLA+ safety speciﬁcation has the form Init ∧ [Next ]vars , where Init is
a predicate describing the initial state, Next is a formula that describes the
next-state relation, and vars is the tuple of speciﬁcation variables. The bulk
of a speciﬁcation consists of the deﬁnition of Next . Its high-level deﬁnition is
Next
∆
= TCInternal ∨ TCRcvMsg ∨ PInternal ∨ PRcvMsg
where the four disjuncts have the following meaning:
• TCInternal describes the “spontaneous” steps of the initiator and of the
TC—that is, steps not taken in response to receipt of a message.
• TCRcvMsg describes the response of the TC to receipt of a participant’s
message.
• PInternal describes the participants’ spontaneous steps.
• PRcvMsg describes the participants’ responses to a message from the TC.
The initiator does not send or receive explicit messages.
Action TCInternal is deﬁned to be A ∧ (unchanged pData), where A is
a disjunction of formulas describing the diﬀerent operations performed by the
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TC or initiator. Here is one of those disjunctions. (An action describes a state
change as a relation between the new and old values of the variables, where
a primed occurrence of a variable represents the new value and an unprimed
occurrence represents the old value.)
∨ The TC ends the volatile prepare and begins the durable prepare. It does this
when it has received Prepared or ReadOnly messages from every participant
that registered as volatile, and it sends a Prepare message to every participant
that registered as durable.
∧ tcData.st = “preparingVolatile”
∧ ∀ p ∈ Participant : tcData.reg [p] = “volatile”
∧ tcData ′ = [tcData except !.st = “preparingDurable”]
∧msgs ′ = msgs ∪ [type : {“Prepare”},
dest : {p ∈ Participant :
tcData.reg [p] = “durable”}]
∧ unchanged iState
Action TCRcvMsg has the form ∃m ∈ msgs : B , where B is a disjunction,
each disjunct representing the receipt of a diﬀerent type of message m. We
have written these disjuncts in a rather unusual way. A typical subaction has
the form
(B1 ∧ P1) ∨ . . . ∨ (Bn ∧ Pn)
where the Bi (called the “guards”) are mutually exclusive state predicates
and the Pi describe the new values of variables. If none of the guards is true,
then the subaction equals false and no step is possible. To be able to check
the completeness of our speciﬁcation, we wanted TLC to ﬂag an error if it
evaluated this subaction and found none of the guards true. So, we instead
wrote the subaction as
case B1 → P1  . . .  Bn → Pn
These two expressions have the same meaning if exactly one of the guards
is true. But the latter expression is undeﬁned if none of the guards is true,
causing TLC to report an error. Here is one of the disjuncts in the deﬁnition
of TCRcvMsg .
∨ m is a Committed message.
∧m.type = “Committed”
∧ case The normal case, in which the TC is in the committing state. In
this case, it sets the element of tcData.reg corresponding to the
sender to committed .
tcData.st = “committing”
→
tcData ′ = [tcData except !.reg [m.src] = “committed”]
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 If the TC has forgotten the transaction, then the transaction has
been committed and m is ignored.
∧ tcData.st = “ended”
∧ tcData.res = “committed”
→
unchanged tcData
∧ unchanged 〈iState, pData, msgs〉
The initiator’s state and the participants’ data are unchanged, and no
messages are sent.
The deﬁnitions of PInternal and PRcvMsg are similar, except they involve an
additional existential quantiﬁcation over the set of participants.
The speciﬁcation ends with the deﬁnition of Spec, the complete speciﬁca-
tion, and a theorem asserting the invariance of Consistency and of TypeOK ,
a state predicate describing the types of the variables. (TLA+ is an untyped
language.)
Spec
∆
= Init ∧ [Next ]vars
theorem Spec ⇒ (TypeOK ∧ Consistency)
This is the theorem that TLC checked.
6 More Abstract Speciﬁcations
We have also written two higher-level speciﬁcations—a 70-line abstract speci-
ﬁcation that describes only the behavior of the initiator and the participants,
and an intermediate-level shared-memory speciﬁcation that also describes the
transaction coordinator but eliminates all messages. We have checked that
both of these higher-level speciﬁcations are implemented by the protocol spec-
iﬁcation described above.
The purpose of Web services is to provide a framework of interoperable
standards that allow the development of secure and reliable transactional sys-
tems and applications. We therefore want to specify not only WS-AT, but
also systems built on top of it. Our abstract speciﬁcation is useful for this
because it is simpler than the complete speciﬁcation.
The complete WS-AT protocol speciﬁcation can be veriﬁed quickly on a
modern processor. But once this is done, it does not need to be done again
every time a client system is validated. TLC requires 253 seconds to check
all behaviors of the full speciﬁcation for a system with four participants. But
it can check the behaviors of the abstract speciﬁcation with 4 participants in
less than 7 seconds. This savings in time, accompanied by a large reduction
in the size of the state space, will allow the checking of client systems on
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larger models. The procedure can be carried further by providing abstract
speciﬁcations of the client systems to permit their clients to be modeled and
validated more eﬃciently.
The abstract speciﬁcation can also be used as the speciﬁcation of other
protocols. For example, one could obtain a new protocol by replacing 2PC
with a commit protocol that uses a diﬀerent communication topology. If the
new protocol satisﬁed the abstract speciﬁcation, then a client could safely use
it in place of WS-AT.
Before specifying the fully abstract protocol, we speciﬁed its behavior using
shared memory. The shared-memory speciﬁcation is about the same length as
the complete protocol speciﬁcation. It speciﬁes the requirements of the WS-
AT protocol that are independent of what messages are sent. All the internal
data structures and basic transitions are preserved from the complete protocol
speciﬁcation.
During the design of WS-AtomicTransaction, there was a great deal of
discussion about the details of the protocol’s messages. The shared-memory
speciﬁcation, in conjunction with a detailed design, would have helped to
clarify the issues. It would have provided a quick test of whether a proposed
change to the speciﬁcation impacted the semantics, or if it was merely a dif-
ferent way of expressing the same basic protocol.
The higher-level speciﬁcations can also be used for explanation and ex-
perimentation. The two parts of any design activity are determining what to
build and how to build it. These two parts form the two levels of a design—
namely, the requirements and the detailed design. Each level informs the other
through an iterative design activity. TLA+ provides a lingua franca that can
be used to specify both levels precisely. The TLC model checker can automat-
ically verify that the detailed design satisﬁes the requirements. This allows
changes in the design to be checked quickly for their impact on the require-
ments. Model checking can also show how changing the requirements aﬀects
the current detailed design.
The 2PC protocol is very well established and well understood, so with
WS-AT it was clear from the beginning what we were building. With other
new systems, this is often not the case. The requirements develop along with
the detailed design. As soon as users have a clear understanding of what a
system actually does, they think of new applications—many with new require-
ments. Any tool that increases the amount, ﬁdelity, or speed of this feedback
accelerates the design process.
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7 Conclusion
The WS-AT oﬃcial speciﬁcation contains a great deal of detail that is not
captured in the TLA+ speciﬁcation. It very carefully describes data formats
and some messaging interfaces. These are details of the protocol that are
ignored by the TLA+ speciﬁcation, which describes only its behavioral prop-
erties. Such details are straightforward and fairly non-controversial.
The TLA+ speciﬁcation therefore describes the part of the protocol that is
generally left imprecise in current speciﬁcations, and ignores those aspects of
the protocol that are already speciﬁed quite precisely. TLA+thus complements
the approach taken in most existing standards. Having a TLA+ speciﬁcation
can help prevent incompatibility among diﬀerent implementations.
A precise description of a proposed standard can also help avoid misun-
derstanding among the writers of the standard. In a standards committee,
discussions can become very abstract. It is easy for diﬀerent people to inter-
pret statements in diﬀerent ways. A mathematical formula is unambiguous.
Writing formal speciﬁcations can help in designing a protocol. Being able
to check quickly if a protocol speciﬁcation satisﬁes a more abstract speciﬁca-
tion can speed the design process. A high-level speciﬁcation of the protocol’s
requirements can also be used to check the correctness of a protocol’s clients.
TLA+ is a particularly good language for writing standards because it is
based on ordinary mathematics. This makes its semantics particularly simple,
since the semantics of a speciﬁcation language is, by deﬁnition, a translation
into mathematics of speciﬁcations written in the language. As one engineer
said about TLA+, “If I want to ﬁnd out what an expression means, I can look
it up in a math book.”
We are now specifying other WS protocols in TLA+.
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